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Abstract
We show that for a disappointment-averse decision maker, splitting a lottery into
several stages reduces its value. To do this, we extend Gul￿ s (1991) model of disappoint-
ment aversion into a dynamic setting while keeping its basic characteristics intact. The
result depends solely on the sign of the coe¢ cient of disappointment aversion. It can
help explain why people often buy periodic insurance for moderately priced objects,
such as electrical appliances and cellular phones, at much more than the actuarially
fair rate.
Keywords: Disappointment aversion, recursive preferences, compound lotteries.
1. Introduction
Assume you are waiting to receive an important announcement. For concreteness, assume
that you ￿lled a betting ticket regarding the results of a horse race, which is taking place at
the moment and will end in a short time. You have two ways of spending your time until
the race ends. The ￿rst is to turn on the radio and hear the commentator describing ￿live￿
what is happening at the race. The second would be to sit back, wait patiently, and turn the
radio on only once the results of the race are determined. Which one seems more appealing
to you?
The answer to this question may depend on many factors, such as the amount of money
you spent on the ticket, your ￿nancial condition, and most of all, on your personal character.
A plausible answer might be: ￿I prefer to wait and hear only the ￿nal result. Being exposed
to the resolution process bears the risk of perceiving intermediate outcomes as disappointing.
￿We thank Wolfgang Pesendorfer for helpful suggestions.
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1Therefore, since I take disappointments hard, getting partial information in the middle of
the process will only stress me further and cause me to su⁄er more on average.￿
A similar argument can be made by a Ph.D. candidate who has applied to a certain
school. The ￿nal result is expected to arrive in a couple of months, but the student is aware
that he is going to be judged sequentially until that date, according to many parameters
(grades, preparation test results, recommendations, publication list). The student has no
ability to a⁄ect the ￿nal outcome once he has submitted his application. Against the natural
curiosity and psychological need to be involved and receive as much information as possible
regarding his ranking relative to other candidates, a no less natural attitude can be adopted
by the easily disappointed candidate who prefers to receive no information at all until the
￿nal decision has been made.
Gul (1991) suggests a model to study disappointment-averse individuals. According to his
model, the decision maker divides the support of a certain lottery into two groups: the dis-
appointing and the elating prizes. The threshold to this division is determined endogenously,
as follows: equipped with a utility function over prizes, he calculates the expected utility
of the lottery while uniformly assigning to all the disappointing outcomes a greater weight.
The value is thus the certainty equivalent of the lottery where all prizes with a value higher
than this number are considered elations and all prizes with lower value disappointments.
(Mathematical de￿nition below in (1).)
Gul￿ s basic model is static, as all the decision maker cares about is the probability
distribution over ￿nal outcomes. To study the e⁄ect of potential disappointment emerging
from gradual exposure to risk, one needs to extend his model into a dynamic setting. This
requires some additional assumptions regarding the way compound lotteries (i.e., lotteries
whose outcomes are tickets to other lotteries) are evaluated.
As we describe in detail below, we assume that the decision maker folds-back the prob-
ability tree and applies the same (static) preferences as in Gul in every stage. The implied
model maintains preferences, now de￿ned over a richer domain, to be fully determined by the
pair (u;￿)￿ a utility function over prizes and a coe¢ cient of disappointment aversion that
determines the additional weight given to the disappointing outcomes, which is thought of as
a characteristic of the decision maker. Palacious-Huerta (1999) adopts this approach and by
working out an example, demonstrated the tendency of a disappointment-averse individual
to prefer getting information that is resolved all at once rather than gradually. The lottery
used in his example, however, is very special and contains only two prizes. Thus the division
to disappointment and elation is, in that example, obvious at every step of the folding-back
process.
Our aims in this paper are to show that Palacious-Huerta￿ s observation holds in the gen-
2eral case and, in particular, to emphasize the linkage between the sign of the coe¢ cient of
disappointment aversion and the attitude toward the way in which uncertainty is resolved
over time. We show that a disappointment-averse decision maker, that is, one who is charac-
terized by the pair (u;￿) and ￿ > 0, will always prefer any compound lottery to be resolved
in a single stage. The opposite is true if ￿ 6 0.
As an application, we demonstrate that disappointment-averse individuals are likely to
purchase dynamic insurance contracts, such as periodic insurance for electrical appliances
and cellular phones, at much more than actuarially fair rates. The reason is that in addition
to the standard risk premium, they are willing to pay a premium to avoid being exposed
to the gradual resolution of uncertainty. These two premia reinforce one another, and this
aspect makes the individual more reluctant to take risks. While the gradual resolution
premium is non-negative for ￿ > 0, it is not an increasing function of ￿. This observation is
valid in the general case and is independent of the speci￿c insurance problem we consider.
When ￿ is extremely large, the gradual resolution premium converges to zero, which is its
level when the DM is an expected utility maximizer (￿ = 0). Therefore, there is always an
interior value of ￿ in which the gradual resolution premium is maximized.
Dillenberger (2010) studies recursive preferences over compound lotteries and charac-
terized preferences for one-shot resolution of uncertainty, that is, preferences to have any
compound lottery resolved in a single stage. In this paper we give a direct proof that any
disappointment-averse decision maker displays this property. It is remarkable that within the
disappointment aversion class, only one parameter, ￿, accounts for preferences for one-shot
resolution of uncertainty. This feature sheds light on the driving force behind the variety
of applications that use Gul￿ s preferences. (See, for example, Ang, Bekaert and Liu (2005)
who use recursive disappointment aversion preferences to study a dynamic asset allocation
problem.)
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the model
and the statement of our main result. In Section 3 we give a complete mathematical proof
of our result. In section 4 we apply our model to study an insurance problem. We conclude
by suggesting extensions for the basic model.
2. The model and the main theorem
We consider an interval X ￿ R of prizes. A lottery P is a vector of probabilities indexed
by x 2 X such that
P
x2X px = 1, and we restrict to the case in which in any given lottery
the number of possible prizes ( i.e., prizes with non-zero probability) is ￿nite. To avoid
complicating notation, we assume that x 2 X is both the prize and its perceived value. In
3the context of this paper no generality is lost by this, and the same results hold if we assume
a utility function u : X ! R, replacing the prize x by the value u(x).
The value of a lottery is a function that assigns to each lottery a number between the
largest and the smallest x 2 X and that depends on a parameter ￿1 < ￿ < 1. ￿ should be
thought of as a property of the decision maker that captures his disappointment aversion, if
￿ > 0, or elation seeking, if ￿1 < ￿ < 0. (For ￿ = 0 the value will simply be the standard













As discussed in the introduction, this de￿nition goes back to Gul (1991). Thus, when
computing the value V = V￿(P), if say ￿ > 0, we average the prizes in such a way that
disappointing prizes are given an extra weight. The number V is the unique number such
that if the decision maker sets his disappointment-satisfaction threshold at V , then he is
indi⁄erent between carrying out the lottery and receiving V dollars.
We turn to the de￿nition of the value of a two-stage lottery. Assume that one is given m
lotteries, denoted P (j) for j = 1;:::;m. Each lottery P (j) is de￿ned by the probabilities it
assigns to the di⁄erent x 2 X, which we denote p
(j)
x . For the two-stage lottery, one is given
probabilities ￿1;:::;￿m for gaining the lotteries P (1);:::;P (m) respectively. In the ￿rst stage
a lottery P (j) is realized with probability ￿j and then, in the second stage, a prize is obtained
according to P (j).
Note that the probability distribution over ￿nal prizes induced by the two-stage lottery




x . The value of this reduced
two-stage lottery is as de￿ned in (1) above for a (one-stage) lottery, V (P). This corresponds
to the case where the decision maker is not exposed to the gradual resolution of uncertainty.
On the other hand, if the decision maker sees the results of the ￿rst stage of the lottery,
then he or she will be disappointed or elated also with the results of this ￿rst stage. The
value of the two stage lottery in this case will be the value of a lottery Q with prizes
V (P (j)) with probabilities ￿j, for j = 1:::m. (Notice that we now have a di⁄erent set
Y = (V (P (j)))m
j=1 ￿ Rm of prizes.) Notice that the same parameter ￿ is used to decide the
value of each lottery P (j) and the value of the lottery Q.
We now show that with the above de￿nitions, a decision maker who is disappointment-
averse prefers not to be exposed to the gradual resolution of uncertainty, and an elation-
seeking decision maker will want to be involved and receive information as many times as
possible during the resolution process, despite the fact that he has no possibility of a⁄ecting
4the outcome. More precisely our main theorem reads as follows:
Theorem 1: Given m lotteries P (j) = (p
(j)
x )x2X, and numbers 0 ￿ ￿j ￿ 1, j = 1;:::;m,
such that
Pm





x to the prize x 2 X,
Q assigns probability ￿j to the prize V (P (j)).
Then, for ￿ ￿ 0 we have V (P) ￿ V (Q), and for ￿1 < ￿ ￿ 0 we have V (P) ￿ V (Q).
3. Proof of the main theorem
In order to prove Theorem 1, we need to ￿rst discuss the function V = V￿(P). We ￿x ￿ > 0
and omit the index ￿ throughout this section. The case ￿ < 0 is completely analogous, and
we comment on it at the end of the proof.








with the v-axis, that is, V is the solution of fP(v) = 0. This function is continuous, decreas-
ing, and linear on every interval [xi;xi+1] that does not include points x with px > 0 in its
interior. The slope of fP at a point v 2 R (with pv = 0) is equal to (￿1￿￿
P
x￿v
px). If P is non
trivial (assigning positive probability to more than one value) then one has fP(minX) > 0
and fP(maxX) < 0.
Given two lotteries P and Q, showing that V (P) ￿ V (Q) is equivalent (since fP is
decreasing) to showing that fP(V (Q)) ￿ 0. Notice that by the de￿nition of P and of fP we
have that fP(v) =
Pm
j=1 ￿jfj(v) where we have denoted fP(j)(v) = fj(v).
For notational convenience we also denote the value of P (j) by vj = V (P (j)) and the value




￿j(vj ￿ w) + (1 + ￿)
X
fj:vj￿wg
￿j(vj ￿ w) = 0:
The above implies that
X
￿jvj ￿ w = ￿
X
fj:vj￿wg
￿j(w ￿ vj): (2)
In particular we see here that w ￿ E(Q), the expected value of Q.
5Proof of Theorem 1. We wish to show that fP(w) ￿ 0. We subtract from it 0 =
Pm






























































































We already see that the ￿rst and third terms are nonnegative. We now use the relation

















x (w ￿ vj):













































6It is evident that both expressions on the right-hand side are non negative. In particular
we get that for ￿ > 0, fP(w) ￿ 0, which in turn implies that V (P), which is the zero of
fP(v), satis￿es V (P) ￿ w = V (Q). We did not use the fact that ￿ > 0 anywhere in the
derivation (which consisted of equalities only), and similarly we get that for ￿1 < ￿ < 0 one
has fP(w) ￿ 0, so that in the case of elation seeking we have V (P) ￿ w = V (Q). ￿
4. Application, an insurance problem
Theorem 1 can be readily extended to compound lotteries with arbitrary (￿nite) number of
stages. The decision maker evaluates any n-stage lottery by folding back the probability tree
and applying the same V￿ in each stage. A decision maker with such preferences prefers to
replace each compound sub-lottery with its single-stage counterpart. Let Qn be an n-stage
lottery that induces the same probability distribution over ￿nal outcomes as P. The amount
V￿(P) ￿ V￿ (Qn) is the gradual resolution premium, that is, the amount that the decision
maker would pay to replace Qn with P.1 By Theorem 1, ￿ > 0 implies V￿(P)￿V￿ (Qn) > 0.
Understanding the e⁄ect of the gradual resolution premium, insurance companies, when
o⁄ering dynamic insurance contracts, can require much greater premiums than the actuari-
ally fair ones and still be sure of consumers￿participation. This can help explain why people
often buy periodic insurance for moderately priced objects, such as electrical appliances and
cellular phones, at much more than the actuarially fair rates. An example is given by Tim
Harford (￿The Undercover Economist￿ , Financial Times, May 13, 2006):
￿There is plenty of overpriced insurance around. A popular cell phone retailer
will insure your $90 phone for $1.70 a week￿ nearly $90 a year. The fair price of
the insurance is probably closer to $9 a year than $90.￿
To illustrate, consider the following insurance problem: an individual with Gul￿ s prefer-
ences, with a linear u and ￿ > 0, owns an appliance (e.g., a cellular phone) that he is about
to use for n periods. The individual gets utility 1 in any period the appliance is used and 0
otherwise. In each period, there is an exogenous probability (1 ￿ p) that the appliance will
not work (it might be broken, fail to get reception, etc.). The individual can buy a periodic
insurance policy, which guarantees the availability of the appliance, for a price z 2 (1 ￿ p;1).
Therefore, if he buys insurance for some period, he gets a certain utility of (1 ￿ z), and oth-
erwise he faces the lottery in which with probability p he gets 1, and with the remaining
probability he gets 0. For simplicity, assume that the price of a replacement appliance is 0,
1In this section we keep assuming that u is linear. More generally the gradual resolution premium is the
value x that solves: u
￿
u￿1 (V￿(P)) ￿ x
￿
= V￿ (Qn):
7so that the individual either carries it over from the last period or gets a new one for free in
the beginning of any period.
Let P be the probability distribution over ￿nal outcomes (without insurance). Denote
by X the total number of periods in which the appliance works. Since X is a binomial
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where h(p;￿;n) is the unique natural number such that all prizes greater than it are elating
and all those smaller than it are disappointing.
Let Qn be the corresponding gradual (n-stage) lottery as perceived by the individual. By













k (1 ￿ p)
n￿k (1 + ￿)
n￿k k:
Using standard backward induction arguments, it can be shown that the individual will
buy insurance for all n periods if ￿ >
z￿(1￿p)
(1￿z)(1￿p) > 0. In that case, z < 1￿
V￿(Qn)
n . Nevertheless,
if ￿ is not too high,2 we have 1￿p < 1￿
V￿(P)
n < z, meaning that he would not buy insurance
at all if he could avoid being aware of the gradual resolution of uncertainty.3 This observation
explains why and how the attractiveness of a lottery depends not only on the uncertainty
embedded in it, but also on the way this uncertainty is resolved over time.
Since V￿(P) decreases with ￿, the risk premium, rp(￿ jp;n) := np ￿ V￿(P), is a strictly
increasing function of ￿. The behavior of the gradual resolution premium, grp(￿ jp;n) :=
V￿(P) ￿ V￿ (Qn) is more subtle. We have the following result:
Proposition 1: In the insurance problem described above:
(i) grp(￿ jp;n) > 0 8￿ 2 (0;1)
(ii) grp(0jp;n) = 0 and lim
￿!1
grp(￿ jp;n) = 0
(iii) Single-peakness: There exists ￿￿ (p;n) < 1 such that either 0 < ￿ < ￿0 < ￿￿ or
￿￿ < ￿0 < ￿ implies
grp(￿ jp;n) < grp(￿
0 jp;n) < grp(￿
￿ jp;n)
See ￿gure 1.










3Nayyar (2004) termed such a situation an ￿insurance trap.￿Note that DM still acts rationally given
that without insurance he is forced to be exposed to Q rather than to P.
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Figure 1: grp(￿ jp;n). ￿k;k+1 is the value of ￿ where h(￿ jp;n) decreases from (n ￿ k) to
(n ￿ (k + 1)). grp(￿ jp;n) is non-di⁄erentiable in each such ￿k;k+1. k0 is the smallest natural




In its original context, a higher ￿ implies greater disappointment aversion (as well as
greater risk aversion). As we argued in the introduction, being averse to the gradual res-
olution of uncertainty can be interpreted as dynamic disappointment aversion. Under this
interpretation, it seems intuitive to expect the gradual resolution premium to be an increas-
ing function of ￿. This intuition is wrong and, in fact, item (ii) remains valid independent
of the decision problem under consideration. To see this, note that grp(￿ jp;n) is de￿ned
as the di⁄erence of two functions, both strictly decreasing in ￿. When ￿ = 0, DM cares
only about the expected value of the lottery. When ￿ is su¢ ciently large, all prizes but
0 become elating, and hence the value of P converges to 0. Correspondingly, the value of
the gradual lottery, Qn, converges to the value of the worst sub-lottery that by itself ap-
proaches 0. Since grp(￿ jp;n) is a continuous function and is strictly positive on the positive
reals, there must exist a ￿nite ￿, denoted ￿￿ in ￿gure 1, in which grp(￿ jp;n) is maximized.
Item (iii) sheds further light on the behavior of moderate disappointment-averse individu-
als. It suggests that ￿￿ (p;n) is unique, and that grp(￿ jp;n) is single-peaked. Behaviorally
speaking, moderately disappointment-averse individuals are more inclined to pay a higher
premium than individuals who are either approximately disappointment-indi⁄erent or ex-
tremely disappointment-averse.
95. Extensions
Until now we assume that the function V￿, which is applied recursively, does not change
over time. Time independent V￿ implies that the decision maker does not care when the
uncertainty is resolved as long as all resolution happens in a single stage. We now brie￿ y
suggest how to incorporate preferences for the timing of resolution of uncertainty into our
basic model. While we keep assuming that the decision maker evaluates compound lotteries
using the folding-back procedure, we relax the assumption that V￿ is time independent. In
particular, we assume that for all t, V￿t is a disappointment aversion function, in which ut = u
for all t and ￿t is positive and increasing with t (for example, ￿t = 1 ￿ 1
t+1). Increasing ￿
(while keeping u ￿xed) implies that the decision maker becomes more disappointment-averse
(and more risk-averse) as the time of consumption gets closer.4 Intuitively, an early bad
signal is more likely to be corrected than a late signal, hence the decision maker is more
sensitive to later signals.
For a given lottery P, consider the set of two stage lotteries that induce the same proba-
bility distribution over ￿nal outcomes. If ￿1 < ￿2, the decision maker faces a trade-o⁄: since
￿t > 0 for t = 1;2, Theorem 1 implies that he is averse to the gradual resolution of uncer-
tainty. But since V￿(P) decreases in ￿, he prefers a lottery in which all resolution occurs in
the ￿rst stage to a lottery in which all resolution happens in the second stage. Therefore,
while a compound lottery that fully resolves in the ￿rst stage is unambiguously the most
preferred, it is not clear whether the decision maker prefers a non-degenerate compound
lottery to a lottery in which all resolution takes place in the second stage. An increase in
the distance between ￿1 and ￿2 favors the gradually resolved lottery, whereas the one-shot
aspect dominates as the compound lottery becomes more degenerate (for example, when one
of the second stage nodes is obtained with probability 1 ￿ ", and " > 0 is small enough).5
A di⁄erent extension is a model in which the sequence of ￿s, instead of being exogenously
determined, evolve endogenously as a function of the history of disappointments and elations
4Theorem 5 in Gul (1991) establishes that the risk attitude of two decision makers who have the same
u can be ranked solely by comparing their di⁄erent ￿s. If only changes in risk aversion were concerned, we
could, alternatively, ￿x ￿t = ￿ for all t, and make the concavity of ut increases with t.
5A similar tradeo⁄between early and one-shot resolution of uncertainty was studied in K￿szegi and Rabin
(2009). K￿szegi and Rabin study a model in which utility additively depends on both current consumption
and on recent changes in (rational) beliefs about present and future consumption, where the latter component
displays loss aversion. Denote by ￿t;T the weight that is given to changes in period t < T beliefs about
consumption in period T, and assume that the sequence f￿t;Tg is increasing with t. Under this assumption,
K￿szegi and Rabin provide a set of results that identify the tradeo⁄ that the decision maker faces. In
stating these results, however, they con￿ne their attention to the case in which consumption happens only in
the last period and is binary. In our setup, this corresponds to compound lotteries over only two monetary
prizes. With the modi￿cation of the sequence f￿tg described in the text, we can generate similar predictions
regarding information preferences without restricting the possible outcomes to take only two values.
10in prior stages. Such model can address experimental evidence that suggest that the way
in which risk unfolds over time a⁄ects risk attitudes (see, for example, Thaler and Johnson
(1990)). For a model along these lines, see Dillenberger and Rozen (2010).
6. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let 4V (￿ jp;n) :=grp(￿ jp;n), and for k = 2;3;:::;n ￿ 1, denote 4V (￿ jp;n) with
h(￿ jp;n) = n ￿ k by 4V (k) (￿ jp;n). Some calculations show that
4V
(k) (￿ jp;n)


































The denominator of 4V (k) (￿ jp;n) is always positive, whereas the coe¢ cient np￿ (1 ￿ p) is











k￿1 pn￿k is simply the probability of n ￿ k successes in n ￿ 1
trials of a Bernoulli random variable with parameter p. We then note that the nominator






















. Therefore, item (i) is implied.
Since ￿ = 0 implies expected utility, the ￿rst part of item (ii) is immediate. For the second
part of item (ii), observe that as ￿ increases, the value of the sequential lottery (V (Qn)) is
(smoothly) strictly decreasing and converges to 0, the value of the worst prize in its support.
The value of the one stage lottery (V (b p)) is a⁄ected in two ways when ￿ increases. First,
given a threshold h(￿ jp;n), the value is (smoothly) strictly decreasing with ￿. Second,
h(￿ jp;n) itself is a decreasing step-function of ￿. For ￿ large enough, all prizes but 0 are








To show the existence of ￿￿ (item (iii)), pick ￿0 > 0 such that grp(￿0 jp;n) = ￿ > 0.
Since lim
￿!1
grp(￿ jp;n) = 0, there exists ￿ := max
￿
￿
￿ ￿grp(￿ jp;n) = ￿
2
￿
and ￿ <1. Thus




, and hence achieves its
maximum on this domain. For single-peakness, we have the following two claims:
Claim 1: 8k = 2;3;:::;n￿1, 4V (k) (￿ jp;n) is either strictly increasing or single-peaked on
(0;1).
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The roots of @
@￿4V (k) (￿ jp;n) are the roots of the second-degree polynomial in ￿ that
appears in the nominator.
Evaluated at ￿ = 0, this polynomial is equal to
￿

























n￿k (1 ￿ p)
k￿1
which is true as claimed before.
In addition, the slope of that polynomial at ￿ = 0 is equal to the coe¢ cient of ￿,

















To summarize, both the slope and the intercept of the polynomial in the nominator are
positive at ￿ = 0. Therefore, if C ￿ 0 then @
@￿4V (k) (￿ jp;n) has no positive roots, and
otherwise it has exactly one positive root.k
Note that 4V (￿ jp;n) is a continuous function that is not di⁄erentiable in the points
where h(￿ jp;n) changes. For k = 2;3;:::;n ￿ 1, let ￿k;k+1 be the value of ￿ where
h(￿ jp;n)decreases from (n ￿ k) to (n ￿ (k + 1)). Using the same notation as above, we




@￿4V (k) (￿ jp;n) > lim
￿!+￿k;k+1
@
@￿4V (k+1) (￿ jp;n)
Proof: Apart from at ￿ = 0, where 4V (k) (0jp;n) = 4V (k+1) (0jp;n) = 0, it can be
shown that the two curves cross at exactly one more point, given by
￿k;k+1=
np ￿ (n ￿ k)
￿Pn￿(k+1)








Note that ￿k;k+1 > 0 i⁄ p > n￿k
n . To prove the claim it will be su¢ cient to show that
@
@￿4V (k) (0jp;n) < @
@￿4V (k+1) (0jp;n), since this implies that at ￿k;k+1, 4V (k+1) (￿ jp;n)




(k) (0jp;n) = np
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(k+1) (0jp;n) = np
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To complete the proof, we verify that both claims above are also valid for the two extreme
cases: k = 1 (where only the best prize, n, is elation) and k = n (only the worst prize, 0, is
disappointment).
k = 1: Using the same notation as above we have:
4V








2 ￿ + 1





(1) (￿ jp;n) = n(1 ￿ p)(p ￿ p
n)
(1 ￿ ppn)￿2 + 2￿ + 1
(￿￿ + pn￿ ￿ 1)
2 (￿￿ + p￿ ￿ 1)
2 > 0
for all ￿ ￿ 0 so 4V (1) (￿ jp;n) is strictly increasing with ￿ (claim 1).








(1) (0jp;n) () p >
n ￿ 1
n
so claim 2 follows as well.
13k = n:
4V
(n) (￿ jp;n) = np


























(n) (￿ jp;n) = Cnp
2 (p ￿ 1)
￿2 (1 ￿ p)
n+1 ￿ 1
(￿ (￿p + 1)
n + 1)
2 (￿￿ + p￿ ￿ 1)
2








(n￿1) (0jp;n) () p >
1
n
which is claim 2.
Combining claim 1 and claim 2 ensures that 4V (￿ jp;n)is single-peaked on (0;1). ￿
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